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Money is Interest Bearing With A Possibly Low Opportunity Cost

A central quandary of modern economics in general, and monetary theory in particular, is this: today, in advanced industrial economies, most money—certainly money at the margin—is interest bearing, and the difference between the interest paid on money in, say, a cash management account15 and a T-bill is determined not by monetary policy, but by transactions costs. In effect, with modern technology, individuals can use T-bills for transactions. There is no opportunity cost, at the margin, in holding “money.” (To be sure, there is an opportunity cost in holding currency, but there are few economists who use currency in their regressions attempting to explain inflation or output).

The monetary economics developed over the last three quarters of a century is based on a money demand equation in which there is an opportunity cost for holding money. Standard monetary theories argue that monetary policy exerts its effects through changing the supply of money, which changes the interest rate; and changes in the (real) interest rates affect (real) economic behavior. Reducing the money supply increases the “price” of money—the interest rate—and that in turn reduces investment, reducing aggregate demand. In an open economy, there is one more channel through which monetary policy exercises its influence.

The increase in the interest rate makes it more attractive for foreigners to put their money into the country (and less attractive for those within the country to invest their money abroad.) The induced movement of capital into the country drives up the exchange rate, reducing demand for exports and increasing demand for imports.

The model was a useful one for policymakers, because at least some of the key relationships were stable. While the investment function was presumed unstable—shifting to the left in an economic slump—the money demand functions were presumed stable. Even with a variable level of investment, so long as the elasticity of response of investment to interest rate changes was stable, the government could easily predict the consequences of changes in policy. In many circumstances, the model did extremely well, but at other times—particularly in economic downturns associated with financial sector crises, such as that in the United States in 1991 and in East Asia in 1997-1998— the model performed quite inadequately, and policies based on that model failed to deliver the right medicine in a timely way.

 

A Critique of the Transaction-based Theory of the Demand For Money

There are several reasons why one might be suspicious of traditional explanations. Keynes was, perhaps, not as clear concerning the definition of money as he could have been. The absence of clarity may have been deliberate, enabling him to slip from one use to another, without the reader being aware. We focus our attention on demand deposits, because these are the part of money most directly under the control of monetary authorities, and then slightly more broadly, on M1, which includes currency.

Keynes spoke of three motives for holding money: the precautionary, the speculative, and the transactions motive. Given our definition, only the third is relevant. The other two motives are related to the use of money as a store of value; and as a store of value, money is dominated by treasury bills and money market mutual funds, which yield higher rates of interest. Though some economists have suggested that Keynes’s definition of money really did include these assets (“L” in the standard terminology), surely this broad aggregate is not under the control of monetary authorities. Even when monetary authorities set the money supply as a target, they never focus their attention on this broad measure. Empirical studies have concentrated their attention on narrower definitions, such as M1 (or, as M1 has done increasingly poorly, on M2).

Thus, an analysis of the demand for money (as opposed to dollar denominated government insured short term assets) must focus on the transactions demand for money. (Of course, in a general equilibrium model, demands for all assets are interdependent. Still, it is useful to think of individuals as first deciding on how much they wish to hold in shortterm dollar denominated government insured assets, and then to ask, of that total, how much should be held in the form of money, for transaction purposes.

The past fifteen years has witnessed remarkable changes in transactions technologies. Computers enable the velocity of circulation to become virtually infinite, for instance, in the use of money market accounts. The relationship between conventionally measured money and income has not been stable in recent years. That it would change would be predicted by the theory, given the changes in transactions technology. But the fact that the relationship is not stable, that the changes in velocity do not seem to be predictable not only undermine the usefulness of the theory for practical purposes.

They also force us to reconsider the foundations of the theory. Upon reflection, it becomes clear that the transaction-demand monetary theory was—and should have been recognized to be—badly flawed.

 

The Critical Assumption: Perfect Capital Markets

One of the most important developments in economic theory, but of the past fifteen years has been the exploration of the consequences of imperfect and costly information for the functioning of the capital market.

It has been shown that models that assumed imperfect capital markets may have been much closer to the mark than those that, on the contrary, assumed perfect capital markets.

These studies have shown that capital markets that are competitive—in the sense that word is commonly used—may be characterized by credit and equity rationing. The models based on imperfect and costly information both provide explanations of institutional details of the capital market, details which are either inconsistent with perfect capital market models or about which perfect capital market models have nothing to say; but they also provide a basis of explanation of the many aspects of macro-economic (aggregate) behavior that seem inconsistent with the conventional neoclassical model.

In this first part of the book, we argue that monetary institutions and policy do have important real effects, but for reasons quite different from those of the standard theory. Our objective in these lectures is to explain both why it is that monetary policy is sometimes—effective, and why the conventional explanation of the mechanism by which it works—particularly those versions based on the transactions demand for money—is inadequate.

We should say at the outset that we are not denying that there might be some grain of truth in these conventional explanations, only that they miss the central aspects of the mechanisms by which monetary policy works, and therefore are an unreliable basis for the analysis of monetary policy.

 

The Wavering Case For The Irrelevance Of Money

Research over the past three decades has managed to both strengthen—and weaken—the argument that money does not matter. Extending the general equilibrium approach (Stiglitz (1969, 1974a)) to show the irrelevance of corporate financial policy, public financial policy was shown to have no effect.

Establishing a form of Say’s law for government debt, Stiglitz (1988a) showed that if the government reduced taxes and increased its debt, the demand for government bonds increased by an amount exactly equal to the increase in supply.

Furthermore, a change in the term structure of government debt has no effects. Of course, like any theorem, there were assumptions that went into the analysis. These seemed to be of two sorts: some, like the absence of distortionary tax affects, while they would alter the qualitative result that taxes had no effect, seemed an implausible basis for an argument about why monetary policy should be important: surely its effectiveness did not hinge on the real effects produced by the difference in the change in the dead weight losses arising from an increase in taxes in one year compensated by a decrease in taxes in some later years! Another assumption in the analysis was the absence of intergenerational redistributive effects. While one might agree or disagree with Barro (1974) that the economy is best modeled as a set of dynastic families, with no intergenerational effects, surely short run monetary policy does not hinge on these intergenerational effects.

The other set of assumptions—concerning perfect capital markets (though the analysis does not require there be a complete set of risk and futures markets)—was no different from that assumed in conventional economic models. If that assumption were struck down, with it would fall much of the standard theory. Of course, practical people have long claimed that economists’ models of capital market are unrealistic, and a host of institutional economists (and theoretical economists, when they found it convenient) have made use of the imperfect capital markets assumption. However, higher minded economists have looked derisively at those who made reference to imperfect capital markets, accusing them of, among other sins, ad hocery.

 

Reflections On The Current State Of Monetary Economics

To theorists, monetary economics has long presented a challenge: finding the assumptions under which it does or does not matter. The challenge is all the greater
because while it is easy to construct models in which money matters, it is hard to believe that the quantitative effects in at least many of these are significant enough to account for observed behavior.

For instance, macro-economists have often relied on the real balance effect, the fact that as prices fall, the real value of money increases, making individuals feel better off. However, for moderate rates of decline in prices, the magnitude of the real balance effect is too small to account, for instance, for an economic recovery.

A second example concerns the refutation of the monetarist doctrine that prices move proportionally to increases in the money supply, for any monetary regime. Assume that were the case. Define a monetary regime as a rule of monetary expansion, depending on the state of nature θ, such that is the expected rate of change of the money supply E[dlnM/dt] is a constant; the expected return to holding money is the same among monetary regimes given that prices move proportionally to M. However, if individuals are risk averse, then changes in the monetary regime will affect the probability distribution of returns, and hence, in general, the relative demand for money and capital, and therefore will have real effects, counter to the assumption. However, the issue is whether, given the degree of risk aversion in the market, for relevant changes in the monetary regime, the effects are significant.

 

White Collars Turn Blue - Paul Krugman


A note to readers: This was written for a special centennial issue of the NYT magazine. The instructions were to write it as if it were in an issue 100 years in the future, looking back at the past century.

When looking backward, one must always be prepared to make allowances: it is unfair to blame late 20th-century observers for their failure to foresee everything about the century to come. Long-term social forecasting is an inexact science even now, and in 1996 the founders of modern nonlinear socioeconomics were still obscure graduate students. Still, even then many people understood that the major forces driving economic change would be the continuing advance of digital technology, on one side, and the spread of economic development to previously backward nations, on the other; in that sense there were no big surprises. The puzzle is why the pundits of the time completely misjudged the consequences of those changes.

Perhaps the best way to describe the flawed vision of fin-de-siecle futurists is to say that, with few exceptions, they expected the coming of an "immaculate" economy -- an economy in which people would be largely emancipated from any grubby involvement with the physical world. The future, everyone insisted, would bring an "information economy", which would mainly produce intangibles; the good jobs would go to "symbolic analysts", who would push icons around on computer screens; and knowledge rather than traditionally important resources like oil or land would become the main source of wealth and power.

But even in 1996 it should have been obvious that this was silly. First, for all the talk of an information economy, ultimately an economy must serve consumers -- and consumers don't want information, they want tangible goods. In particular, the billions of Third World families who finally began to have some purchasing power as the 20th century ended did not want to watch pretty graphics on the Internet -- they wanted to live in nice houses, drive cars, and eat meat. Second, the Information Revolution of the late 20th century was -- as everyone should have realized -- a spectacular but only partial success. Simple information processing became faster and cheaper than anyone had imagined possible; but the once confident Artificial Intelligence movement went from defeat to defeat. As Marvin Minsky, one of the movement's founders, despairingly remarked, "What people vaguely call common sense is actually more intricate than most of the technical expertise we admire". And it takes common sense to deal with the physical world -- which is why, even at the end of the 21st century, there are still no robot plumbers.

Most important of all, the prophets of an "information economy" seem to have forgotten basic economics. When something becomes abundant, it also becomes cheap. A world awash in information will be a world in which information per se has very little market value. And in general when the economy becomes extremely good at doing something, that activity becomes less rather than more important. Late 20th-century America was supremely efficient at growing food; that was why it had hardly any farmers. Late 21st-century America is supremely efficient at processing routine information; that is why the traditional white-collar worker has virtually disappeared from the scene.

With these observations as background, then, let us turn to the five great economic trends that observers in 1996 should have expected but didn't.

Soaring resource prices. The first half of the 1990s was an era of extraordinarily low raw material prices. Yet it is hard to see why anyone thought this situation would continue. The Earth is, as a few lonely voices continued to insist, a finite planet; when 2 billion Asians began to aspire to Western levels of consumption, it was inevitable that they would set off a scramble for limited supplies of minerals, fossil fuels, and even food.

In fact, there were some warning signs as early as 1996. There was a temporary surge in gasoline prices during the spring of that year, due to an unusually cold winter and miscalculations about Middle East oil supplies. Although prices soon subsided, the episode should have reminded people that by the mid-90s the world=s industrial nations were once again as vulnerable to disruptions of oil supply as they had been in the early 1970s; but the warning was ignored.

Quite soon, however, it became clear that natural resources, far from becoming irrelevant, had become more crucial than ever before. In the 19th century great fortunes were made in industry; in the late 20th they were made in technology; but today's super-rich are, more often than not, those who own prime land or mineral rights.

The environment as property. In the 20th century people used some quaint expressions -- "free as air", "spending money like water" -- as if such things as air and water were were available in unlimited supply. But in a world where billions of people have enough money to buy cars, take vacations, and buy food in plastic packages, the limited carrying capacity of the environment has become perhaps the single most important constraint on the average standard of living.

By 1996 it was already clear that one way to cope with environmental limits was to use the market mechanism -- in effect to convert those limits into new forms of property rights. A first step in this direction was taken in the early 1990s, when the U.S. government began allowing electric utilities to buy and sell rights to emit certain kinds of pollution; the principle was extended in 1995 when the government began auctioning off rights to use the electromagnetic spectrum. Today, of course, practically every activity with an adverse impact on the environment carries a hefty price tag. It is hard to believe that as late as 1995 an ordinary family could fill up a Winnebago with dollar-a-gallon gasoline, then pay only $5 to drive it into Yosemite. Today such a trip would cost about 15 times as much even after adjusting for inflation.

The economic consequences of the conversion of environmental limits into property were unexpected. Once governments got serious about making people pay for the pollution and congestion they caused, the cost of environmental licenses became a major part of the cost of doing business. Today license fees account for more than 30 percent of GDP. And such fees have become the main source of government revenue; after repeated reductions, the Federal income tax was finally abolished in 2043.

The rebirth of the big city. During the second half of the 20th century, the traditional densely populated, high-rise city seemed to be in unstoppable decline. Modern telecommunications had eliminated much of the need for close physical proximity between routine office workers, leading more and more companies to shift their back-office operations from lower Manhattan and other central business districts to suburban office parks. It began to seem as if cities as we knew them would vanish, replaced with an endless low-rise sprawl punctuated by an occasional cluster of 10-story office towers.

But this proved to be a transitory phase. For one thing, high gasoline prices and the cost of environmental permits made a one-pers.

Paul Krugman is a (full-time) Professor of Economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

 

Japanese Management

A stererotyped image of Japanese management, so populer and widely shared among foreigners, also exists among the Japanese themselves.

According to this view, Japanese management has unique features: lifetime commitment of workers to the firm, the length-of-service reward system, and enterprise unionism as a partner in the fiim. These features, which one could legitimalely describe as integral elements of Industrial relations, Imply that workers are immobile and committed to their employer’s implicit guarantee of employment throughout their working careers, that wages are determined not by skill but by length of service and age, and that unions are easily controlled arid cooperative with management.

Also Implicit in this image is the notion that Japanese society has some anthropological peculiarities that emphasize homogeneity, groupism, harmony, and a consensual nature of people. In other words, Japanese management and workers are seen as a basically homogenous group of people within an enterprise who cooperate harmoniously as if they were members of the same family.

This stereotype has been criticized by serious industrial relations scholars who have pointed out some facts about the Japanese employment system that It is governed not by traditional culture but by market forces, that there is ample evidence of elements of conflict in Japanese workshops, and that the implicit employment guarantee for older and long-service workers is found more typically in American and European firm than in their Japanese counterparts.

Nevertheless, the stereotype persists in spite of all the empirical criticism, and recently it appears to have gained more popularity among foreigners as well as the Japanese themselves — but with a new connotation. The new implication is that the recent performance of the Japanese economy is ‘proof’ that Japanese-style management is highly conducive to productivity improvements since it effectivity involves and motivates employees to work toward corporate goals by taking advantage of the employees commitment to the firm and their harmonious cooperation within work groups.

Responding to current worries over decreasing productivity in Western countries, some even go so far as to propose that Japanese-style management be adopted as a new management technique.

Thank You For Reading Japanese Management
 
 
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